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THE EFFECT OF VICTIM RELIGION 
ON JUROR PERCEPTIONS OF HATE CRIMES 
 
 The present study investigated mock juror perceptions of hate crimes in the 
courtroom, specifically whether a victim’s religion (Atheist, Christian, Jewish, or Muslim) 
influenced the likelihood that a mock juror would render a hate crime verdict. I employed 
a mock juror methodology where participants read an assault trial summary, rendered a 
verdict, and answered a series of rating questions about the victim and defendant. Two 
theoretical explanations were proposed to explain the main effect of victim religion on 
participant verdict decisions; that participants would be most likely to render a guilty 
verdict when the victim is considered an in-group member (i.e., same religion) or when 
participants perceived the victim’s religion to be commonly targeted in religion-motivated 
hate crimes. The results showed a main effect of victim religion on participant verdict 
decisions, such that the Jewish victim received the highest percentage of hate crime 
verdicts. Participant perceptions of the victim’s trustworthiness and the defendant’s bias 
mediated the relationship between participant religion (Christian or Jewish) and verdict 
decisions. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for law enforcement, 
social psychology, and policy. 
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The Effect of Victim Religion on Juror Perceptions of Hate Crimes 
Overview 
 The US Department of Justice (2010, p. 1) defines a hate crime as “the violence of 
intolerance and bigotry, intended to hurt and intimidate someone because of their race, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability”. In addition to bias being the primary 
motivation for committing a crime against a particular person(s), perpetrators of hate crimes 
often aim to instill fear in the victims, as well as the communities that the victims belong to (US 
Department of Justice, 2010). For example, the perpetrator of a hate crime will target a single 
Muslim or small group of Muslims in order to instill fear into a larger Muslim community, such 
as Muslims within the United States. From the perspective of the perpetrator, victims of hate 
crimes are “interchangeable” as long as they belong to the target group (Levin & McDevitt, 
2002). The present study aimed to understand mock juror perceptions of hate crimes against 
victims of various religions, specifically whether crimes against a particular religion are seen as 
more likely to be perceived as a hate crime. 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015) conducts the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) 
each year in order to collect statistics on a variety of crimes. In 2014, the UCR collected hate 
crime data from law enforcement agencies around the United States and reported 5,479 hate 
crime incidents. The UCR report showed that 47% of the incidents stemmed from racial bias, 
18.6% were motivated by sexual-orientation bias, 18.6% resulted from religious bias, 11.9% 
were caused by ethnicity bias, and the remaining were caused by bias against persons with 
disabilities and gender-identity bias. Prejudice is “a social orientation either towards whole 
groups of people or towards individuals because of their membership of a particular group” 
(Brown, 2010, p. 4). The present study will focus on the second most common reason for the 
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perpetration of hate crimes, those motivated by bias against persons of a particular religion. Past 
research has investigated jury decision-making for the other two most common types of targeted 
groups, racial groups (Saucier, Hockett, Zanotti, & Heffel, 2010) and sexual-orientation groups 
(Cramer, Wakeman, Chandler, Mohr, & Griffin, 2013), but to date, little research has been 
conducted to understand juror decision-making when the victim is targeted because of their 
religion. 
 According to the UCR (2015), the three most common religions that are targeted in hate 
crimes are Jewish (56.8%), Muslim (16.1%), and Catholics (6.1%). Although targeted less-
commonly, Protestants (2.5%) and Atheists/Agnostics (1.2%) are also victims of hate crimes in 
the United States. In addition to the type of victim targeted, the UCR also presents data regarding 
the types of offenses committed in hate crimes. The majority of these offenses are committed 
against an individual person or group (60.2%) rather than against property (39%). Additionally, 
the most common type of crime reported in hate crimes against a person or persons is 
intimidation (43.1%), followed by simple assault (37.4%), and aggravated assault (19%). From 
this data, one sees that nearly all reported hate crimes result in emotional and/or physical harm 
against the victims, making these crimes important to study. 
Offender Profile and Motivation 
 Many people believe that perpetrators of hate crimes are members of extremist groups or 
those who have a deeply rooted hatred toward a particular group, but this is often not the case. 
Rather, perpetrators of hate crimes are typically young white males who have not had much 
contact with the criminal justice system, and are not often members of a particular hate group. In 
a study of actual hate crimes, Levin (2002) found that less than 5% of the hate crimes studied 
had perpetrators that were members of official hate groups. Additional research conducted by 
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Craig (2002) studied perpetrators of hate crimes and argued that there is nothing remarkable 
about them, adding that they are often from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds. From the 
above-mentioned research (Levin, 2002; Craig, 2002), it is clear that hate crime offenders are not 
easily classified into ethnic or racial categories, and are often not characterized by their hate for a 
particular out-group. 
 While there may not be a clear way for socially categorizing perpetrators of hate crimes, 
the motivation and justification for a hate crime perpetrator’s behavior is unique to these crimes. 
According to Sun (2006), offenders of hate crimes have a distorted reality that ofen causes them 
to blame their actions on the victim. Oftentimes, perpetrators of hate crimes will not only blame 
their victim, but will perceive themselves as being the victim in the situation the perpetrator 
created. Additionally, social cognition research (Bodenhausen, Macraw, & Hugenberg, 2003; 
Fiske & Taylor, 1991) has shown that people tend to explain their actions using a self-serving 
bias, meaning that they rationalize their actions in a way that justifies them as desirable and 
reasonable from their own point of view (Davidson, 1990). Due to this distortion of social 
reality, hate crime offenders may argue that their behavior is justified because the victim’s 
membership group deserved targeting. For example, the perpetrator of a hate crime may justify 
his behavior by stating that the victim had interrupted or intruded on his life, thus justifying the 
perpetrator’s retaliatory actions against the victim. However, in reality, the perpetrator 
exaggerates the victim’s intrusive behavior in order to justify his own extreme response. From 
this example, the motivations of a perpetrator are self-serving in a hate crime scenario. 
 According to Levin and McDevitt (1993), committing hate crimes occurs due to one of 
four types of motivation—thrill seeking, defensive, mission, and retaliatory. Thrill-seeking hate 
crimes occur when young people in small groups leave their neighborhood to target a minority 
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group (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002). For example, a group of teenagers may start by 
making jokes about Jewish people before using this as cause to seek out a Jewish person to 
victimize. It is important to note that the individuals in these groups are usually motivated 
primarily by peer-pressure and conformity and not by bias against the target group. 
The second category of hate crime motivation is reactive (defensive) crimes. A hate 
crime perpetrator motivated by defense believes that the target has intruded on their territory or 
property, thus igniting anger in the perpetrator. As an example, a neighborhood of Christian 
families may feel unsettled if a Muslim family moves in. Additionally, if one of the Christian 
residents has an existing bias against Muslims, they may perpetrate a defense-motivated hate 
crime against the Muslim family. Unlike the first category, hate crimes motivated by defense 
often take place in the perpetrator’s own neighborhood or territory, which ignites the sense of 
intrusion experienced by the perpetrator. 
Mission motivated hate crimes make up the third category, and are the least frequent type 
of hate crime (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Although mission hate crimes occur the least, these are 
the most common type of hate crime portrayed in the media because the perpetrator typically 
acts alone and harms an entire group of people. For example, the highly publicized massacre 
involving an historic African American church in Charleston, South Carolina by Dylann Roof 
(NBC News, 2015) was a mission-motivated hate crime. Perpetrators of mission-motivated hate 
crimes are often mentally unstable and believe that they are acting to get revenge on the minority 
group (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). 
The final category of hate-crime motivation is retaliatory crimes, in which a rumored 
incident in which the minority group has allegedly wronged the perpetrator’s in-group motivates 
a perpetrator (McDevitt et al., 2002). For example, a group of Jewish men may perpetrate a hate 
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crime against a Christian individual if the Jewish men believe that the Christian made a biased 
remark towards them. It is important to note that the original comment or crime does not need to 
have actually occurred as long as the perpetrator of the hate crime believes that it did. 
Development of Prejudice 
 Prejudice is described as a general negative evaluation of a person or group (Brown, 
2010). Humans are not born with prejudice, but we develop it at a very young age when exposed 
to stereotypes in our society from friends, family, and even strangers (Allport, 1954; Nelson, 
2002). Research regarding the development of prejudice has been conducted for decades, often 
with the belief that understanding the development of prejudice can help address the issues that 
result from extreme forms of prejudice. A study by Castelli, De Dea, and Nesdale (2008) found 
that children between the ages of three and six were highly sensitive to nonverbal behaviors of 
adults in a bi-racial social interaction. The preschool-aged children watched a video of an 
interaction between a white male and black male in which the white male has a positive verbal 
attitude and a nonverbal attitude that is either positive or negative. In addition to identifying 
negative nonverbal behavior, the children were able to attribute the white actor’s negative 
feelings toward other black men who were not involved in the original interaction. Castelli et al. 
provided evidence that the nonverbal behavior observed by young children influenced their 
perceptions of an interaction, and can influence the development of prejudice. 
As young children learn of the existence of social groups they naturally categorize 
themselves and others into social categories (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble & Fuligni, 2001). When 
children categorize people by race, they are using a lay theory which states that those who are 
similar to themselves are good and those who are different from themselves are bad (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979 in Cameron et al., 2001). Past research has shown that white children show a 
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preference for their own social category by as early as age three, but these children will show 
less of a preference for their white social group around age seven (Aboud, 1988; Brown, 1995 in 
Cameron et al., 2001). Interestingly, Cameron et al. believe that a child’s understanding of racial 
constancy, that a person’s race does not change during the life course, can contribute to a child’s 
preference for their in-group (Williams & Katz, 1997; Cameron et al.). Another social cognitive 
transition that is argued to be critical to a child’s preference for their in-group takes place 
between ages seven and nine when children switch their descriptions of a person from physical 
traits to internal or psychological traits. It is during this time that children place a societal 
stereotype onto members of out-groups, leading to prejudicial attitudes toward out-group 
members (Cameron et al.). 
When young children learn prejudice against certain groups by observing their parents 
and other adults they will also learn to associate racial slurs with the stereotypes they already 
know (Allport, 1954). For example, a Caucasian child will associate the term “Negro” with dark 
skinned people and other people he learns to think of as out-group members. Past research has 
shown that young children exhibit signs of intergroup bias as young as four years of age 
(Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001; Doosje et al., 2011; Degner & Dalege, 2013). Although 
children’s prejudice against out-group members may never develop into a problem that would 
cause them to harm out-group members, it often leads to a distinction between “those like me” 
and “those unlike me”. These distinctions, referred to as schemas, are mental models of a 
concept or idea that includes all knowledge we have of that particular concept (Nelson, 2002). 
As adults, we have a schema of a particular group that includes everything we have 
learned about that group throughout our lives. Schemas about a particular group that include 
primarily negative attributes can lead to prejudice against that group. When a person is faced 
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with certain situations, such as when a person feels that an out-group member has wronged their 
in-group, their schemas influence their reaction, potentially leading to harm done against 
members of the out-group (Cacault, Goette, Lalive, & Thoenig, 2015; Hansen, Rakhshan, Ho, & 
Pannash, 2015). For example, if a group of African American men believe that a Caucasian man 
made racist comments towards them, the African American men might be more likely to retaliate 
if their schema of Caucasian men involves them being racist and capable of harm. Linville, 
Salovey and Fischer (1986) argued that schemas for in-groups are much more complex than 
schemas for out-groups, such that our perception of the in-group involves a complex group with 
several individualities, while the out-group is perceived as all being the same. When members of 
out-groups lack individuality, it becomes likely that they will be dehumanized. If a group of 
people is thought of as “less than human”, such as the Jewish people during the Holocaust or the 
Hutus during the Rwanda genocide, violence against them becomes increasingly likely (Smith, 
Stones, Peck, & Naidoo, 2007). 
In the classic camp study conducted by Sherif (1958), the researchers divided the boys 
who attended a traditional summer camp into arbitrary groups in the hope of creating conflict 
between the two groups. Even though the groups had equal athletic ability and varying 
personality types, the two groups created favorable attitudes toward the boys in their own group 
and unfavorable attitudes toward the members of the other group. Sherif’s experiment shows 
how easily one can create prejudice, even when there are no measurable differences between 
groups. Fortunately, Sherif found a reduction in prejudice when the two groups needed to work 
together for a common goal. Allport (1954) stated that we tend to prefer those like ourselves, 
though the way we define what makes someone like us can be fluid depending on the situation. 
In the Sherif experiment, the boys’ definition of someone like them depended on the activities 
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and challenges they were facing. Thus, fluidity is an important characteristic of prejudice and can 
help explain how people develop and eliminate prejudice at all stages of life. 
The frequency of technology use in today’s society can also hasten the spread of 
prejudicial ideas. Technology helps a group’s ideas spread to larger areas and to more people 
with less effort. In fact, Lawson and Henderson (2009) argue that the increase in the number of 
hate groups may be due to the advantage that the Internet provides to people trying to spread 
their message. The Internet has allowed like-minded extremists to connect with each other and 
share their cause with impressionable people, especially young teenagers. According to Lawson 
and Henderson (2009), between the years of 2005 and 2009, white supremacists recruited new 
members and spread their message through mainstream social media sites like Facebook and 
social media sited for white supremacists like “New Saxon”. Additionally, extremists sometimes 
post anti-Semitic comments at the end of online news articles, even if the article is unrelated to 
these comments. Unfortunately, the ease of communicating with people around the globe has 
allowed hate to spread in ways it never has before. 
Religious Prejudice 
 Traditional psychological research (i.e., Allport & Ross, 1967; Allport, 1954) has found 
evidence for the association between religiosity and prejudice against out-group members. 
Allport and Ross (1967) reported that both intrinsically (those who engage in religious practices 
as a valued end) and extrinsically (those who use religion as a means to other personal coping or 
social ends) religious people are the most prejudiced people. Although many religions have 
foundations that preach unconditional love for all people, social science research (Altemeyer, 
1996; Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009) has shown a connection between 
religious people and prejudice toward people unlike themselves. Fundamentalism is one of the 
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most reliable links between religiosity and prejudice (Altemeyer, 1996; Leak & Finken, 2011). 
According to Altemeyer (1996), fundamentalism is the belief that only one set of religious 
teachings is true, and that people must follow these original teachings today. In addition to 
following their own strict beliefs, fundamentalists learn to perceive everyone else as being part 
of the out-group, which can easily lead to prejudice against anyone unlike themselves 
(Altemeyer, 1996).  
 Rowatt et al. (2009) analyzed data from 1,588 U.S. adults who filled out the Baylor 
Religion Survey in 2007 in order to test their hypothesized link between religiosity, right wing 
authoritarianism, political ideology, and attitudes toward historically disadvantaged social 
groups. They found that general religiousness, as measured by participant responses to their 
degree of religiousness, frequency of attendance at service, reading of sacred books, and prayer, 
to be associated with less accepting attitudes toward homosexuals and racial minorities. To 
measure right wing authoritarianism, participants rated their agreement with three statements; 
obedience and respect are the most important things kids should learn, we must crack down on 
troublemakers to save our moral standards and keep law and order, and people should be made to 
show respect for America’s traditions. The results showed that participants who ranked high in 
right wing authoritarianism, meaning they highly agreed with each of the statements, also ranked 
high in general religiousness and general racial prejudice. Thus, some mainstream religions in 
the United States (e.g., Judeo-Christianity) are associated with prejudice against homosexuals 
and minority races. This finding is in support of historical evidence that has associated the strict 
following of religious teaching with prejudice. According to Jenkins (2008) this association has 




Effects on Victims of Hate Crimes 
 Research has shown that the psychological effects of hate crimes are more severe than 
regular crimes, such as a typical simple assault (D’Augelli & Grossman, 2001; Herek, Gillis, & 
Cogan, 1999; Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1997). This increase in severity could be the result 
of the additional emotional fear of being a target because of their membership in a particular 
group on top of the physical harm that a victim experiences from a hate crime. It is important to 
note that although they are not usually associated with murder, hate crimes generally consist of 
very brutal and violent crimes, so the additional psychological harm can make hate crimes 
extremely difficult for victims. In June 2015, a complete stranger brutally stabbed a group of 
men with an 8” Rambo knife after calling them “faggots” for wearing skinny jeans (Campbell, 
2015). Thus, the men in this example will likely be fearful to be targeted again because of their 
appearance, in addition to the physical harm of being stabbed. However, in a hate crime, the 
actual victims are not the only ones experiencing fear, because other members of the targeted 
group, such as LGBT individuals in this case, will often experience heightened fear of being a 
target by people with prejudice attitudes toward their group. Saucier et al. (2010) reported that 
victims of hate crimes can experience increased levels of depression, anxiety, traumatic stress, 
anger, and a negative view of the world (e.g. “I don’t feel safe in this world”). An additional 
reason for the increase in hate crime victims’ emotional distress is the public’s reaction to their 
victimization (Rayburn, Mendoza, & Davison, 2003). According to Lyons (2006), victims of 
hate crimes are not likely to receive significant social support, which can make them feel isolated 
and helpless. Denkers (1999) argued that a supportive social environment after a person is 
victimized facilitates the victim’s positive adjustment. Thus, victims of hate crimes, who do not 
 
 11 
often receive positive social support, are likely to deal with the negative emotional response of 
victimization as well as social rejection.  
 When the effects of a hate crime reach beyond the immediate victim into other members 
of the minority group, one may acknowledge that the perpetrator’s goal is to send a larger 
message. Thus, hate crimes are often referred to as “message crimes” because perpetrators often 
wish to send a message to the entire target group that they could be victimized next (Iganski, 
2001). These target minority groups may learn to be distrusting of their communities and 
governments for allowing the perpetuation of bigotry. Perry and Alvi (2011) conducted a study 
where 27 individuals filled out a survey that asked about their emotions, experiences, and 
perceptions following a hate crime against someone in their identity group. Their results showed 
that 75% of respondents reported that they were fearful that another attack could happen against 
their target group and that they felt unwelcome in the perpetrator’s community. Additionally, 
respondents reported that their community did not seem willing to help them, which made them 
lose faith in their communities. 
Legislation Targeting Hate Crimes 
 In addition to the traumatic physical and psychological impact on the victims, hate crimes 
also violate the victims’ core American values of equality, justice, freedom, opportunity, and 
citizenship (Kentucky Criminal Justice Council, 2002). According to the Human Rights 
Campaign (2015), the United States began documenting crimes motivated by bias and hatred in 
1989 when Congress enacted the Hate Crime Statistics Act. In 1993, the Hate Crime Sentencing 
Enhancement Act became law, such that those convicted of a bias-motivated crime could receive 
an additional sentence as decided by the Judge for their case. Unfortunately, Federal hate crime 
legislation did not protect all victims of hate crimes until the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd 
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Hate Crimes Prevention Act was signed in 2009. Under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the 
Federal government extends protection from hate crimes to those targeted for their actual or 
perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability. Previously, the Federal 
government only protected hate crime victims targeted because of their race, religion, and 
national origin (Anti Defamation League, nd). Additionally, prior to the enactment of the Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act, the Federal government could only get involved in a hate crime 
investigation when an attack on a victim occurred during a federally protected activity like 
serving on a jury or attending a public school (Anti Defamation League, nd). 
Although it is important to punish those who act on their biased beliefs against a 
particular group, this can lead to criticism that the existing legislation punishes these people for 
their thoughts, which is counter to the First Amendment right of free speech and thought. 
However, hate crime legislation is not criminalizing hate speech, but rather it criminalizes harm 
done out of hate. Thus, hate crime legislation does not punish a person’s thoughts, but rather 
punishes the perpetrator for acting upon their thoughts. It is also important to note that the 
majority of existing hate crime have an additional layer of criminality, or sentence, on top of the 
original crime’s sentence (Adams, 2005). Therefore, being convicted of a hate crime involves an 
initial conviction of the primary crime committed, such as arson or assault, with the hate crime 
addition on top of this original charge.  
Legislation targeting hate crimes often mandates more severe penalties than a similar 
crime not classified as a hate crime (Cramer, 1999; Levin, 2002). The enhancement of 
sentencing for persons convicted of hate crimes is often justified by showing that hate crimes 
have a more severe physical and psychological impact on victims than many regular crimes 
(Saucier, Hockett, & Wallenberg, 2008). While most states, like New Jersey (NJSA 2C:16-1), 
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use hate crime legislation to enhance the mandatory sentence for a particular crime, other states 
like Kentucky (KRS 532.031) simply deny a person convicted of a hate crime from being 
granted probation. 
Hate Crimes in the Courtroom 
Hate crimes are difficult to prosecute in the courtroom because the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant’s primary motivation for committing the crime was their bias against the 
victim. According to Plumm and Terrance (2013), the perpetrator of a hate crime may commit 
the crime because of fear, ignorance, a misunderstanding, anger, or hate—making it difficult to 
prove the defendant’s motive for committing the crime. Mens rea, the mental state of a person on 
trial for a particular crime, is a crucial element of the Prosecution’s requirement to prove that 
bias against the victim was the primary motivation for the defendant’s actions. Bell (2002) has 
shown that jurors use certain indicators, such as biased comments or gestures, vandalized 
property, or perceptions of the crime by the victim and witnesses to establish that the defendant 
was primarily motivated by bias. Hate crimes are typically underreported and notoriously 
difficult to prosecute (Wagner, 2015) because of how difficult it is to prove that bias primarily 
motivated the defendant, which could explain why little psychological research exists to 
understand courtroom decision-making in hate crime cases. 
A few studies investigating hate crimes in the courtroom exist, but none examined mock 
juror perceptions and juror decision making in the context of victim religion. Plumm, Terrance, 
and Austin (2014) investigated the effect of ambiguity and expectations on mock juror 
perceptions of hate crimes against sexual minority groups (Study 1) and Native Americans 
(Study 2). Their study used a trial transcript methodology where participants read direct and 
cross-examination for all witnesses in an assault case using Minnesota’s penal code. In Study 1, 
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the victim (described as gay or straight) was involved in a gay pride parade as a spectator or 
participant. The results for Study 1 showed mock jurors to be more likely to believe the 
defendant should be convicted when the victim was not gay than when he was gay. Additionally, 
participants were more likely to convict the defendant when the victim was watching the parade 
and least likely to convict the defendant when the victim was marching quietly in the parade. 
Study 2 used a similar methodology as Study 1, but the researchers manipulated the 
victim’s race as either Native American Indian or not. The victim’s involvement in the Native 
American Heritage pride parade was identical to Study 1; he was either involved in the parade or 
acting as a spectator. Although there were no significant differences across conditions in the 
conviction of the defendant, Study 2’s results did show a significant difference in the amount that 
participants blamed the victim for the assault. Specifically, mock jurors reported higher levels of 
blame toward the victim who identified himself as Native American rather than when he did not 
identify as Native American.  
 In addition to perceptions of victims in hate crime victims, additional psychological jury 
research has aimed to understand perceptions of hate crime legislation and sentencing. Cramer, 
Kehn, Pennington, Wechsler, Clark and Nagle (2013) conducted a two-part study that 
investigated the impact of jury instructions, participants’ attitudes toward penalty enhancement 
for defendants convicted of hate crimes, and the effect of victim type on sentencing and blame. 
The same methodology used in two studies involved participants completing two parts of a jury-
instruction vignette. In part 1 of each study participants became familiar with the victim and 
perpetrator characteristics (e.g., name, age, occupation) in a second-degree murder trial. A 
summary of the case stated that the victim and perpetrator got into an argument at the victim’s 
front door. The perpetrator overpowered the victim and shot him with a gun twice in the chest. 
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Participants recommended a sentence for the perpetrator given Federal sentencing guidelines 
(235-293 months) for second-degree murder. It is important to note that during part 1, 
participants were unaware that the murder was a hate crime. Part 2 of the procedure for both 
studies consisted of a sentence that added that the murder described in part 1 was a hate crime. 
Participants again reported their recommended sentence using the Federal sentencing guidelines 
for a second-degree murder hate crime, such that the minimum sentence increases from 235 
months when the murder is not considered a hate crime to 324 months when the murder is a hate 
crime. 
In Study 1, after reading the vignette and providing sentence recommendations, 
participants rated their feelings toward sentence enhancement for a perpetrator convicted of a 
hate crime. Results showed that participants who agreed with the Sentencing Enhancement Act 
were more likely to increase their recommended sentence in part 2 of the vignette, when it was 
specified that the perpetrator had been accused of a hate crime. Results from Study 1 also 
showed a decrease in victim blame and an increase in perpetrator blame for participants who 
agreed with the Sentencing Enhancement Act for a perpetrator convicted of a hate crime. Thus, 
participants who agreed with the sentencing enhancement for perpetrators convicted of hate 
crime were more likely to increase the convicted perpetrator’s sentence according to Federal 
guidelines, while also reporting less blame toward the victim and increased blame toward the 
perpetrator.  
Study 2 investigated the effects of jury instructions, penalty enhancement agreement, and 
victim type (gay, transgender, or African American). In Study 2, the sentence in part 2 further 
specified that the perpetrator targeted the victim because of his stated race, sexuality, or sexual 
identity (depending on condition)—a hate crime. The results from Study 2 showed that 
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participants gave longer sentences when there was a gay victim than a transgender victim. 
Similar to Study 1, participants reported less blame toward the victim and more blame toward the 
perpetrator after a description of the crime as a hate crime.  
Present Study 
 The present study investigated the effect of victim religion on mock juror perceptions of 
hate crimes. Participants read a trial summary based on the case State of New Jersey v. Mark 
Anthony, which accused the defendant of targeting the victim because of his religion. The victim 
was either Atheist, Christian, Jewish, or Muslim. In the present study, like the original case State 
of New Jersey v. Mark Anthony, the defendant was a middle-aged white man accused of 
assaulting his neighbor. The defendant allegedly targeted the victim because of the victim’s 
religious identity. Prior to reading the trial summary, participants rated how much they like each 
of the four religious groups and how violent they believe each group is. Additionally, 
participants answered how frequently they believe each of the four religious groups is targeted in 
religious-based hate crimes. A control condition, where the defendant was only accused of 
assault, was also used. In the control condition, all details were the same, but there was no 
mention of the victim’s religion or a reason why the defendant targeted the victim. 
After reading the trial summary, participants rendered a verdict, rated the guilt of the 
defendant, and explained their verdict in an open-ended format. Additionally, participants rated 
their perceptions of the victim and defendant with respect to their role in the case (e.g., blame, 
sympathy) and their personality characteristics (e.g., trustworthiness, aggressiveness, likability). 
The present study used person perception methods, which are critical to understanding 
participant perceptions of the victim and defendant (Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970). The 
measurement of participants’ explicit perceptions in a hate crime case can lead to socially 
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desirable responses, because participants may not want to appear prejudiced. However, person 
perception methodology limits socially desirable responses because it does not focus on 
purposeful decision-making, but measures intuitive responses (Hastorf et al., 1970; Rayburn et 
al., 2003). I will test three hypotheses based on past research regarding hate crimes and prejudice 
behavior: 
Hypothesis 1. I hypothesize a main effect of victim religion for verdict, such that participant 
verdict decisions will be significantly different based on the victim’s religion. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that the control condition will receive fewer guilty verdicts than when the victim is 
the target of a hate crime. I hypothesize that participants will report more sympathy for victims 
of hate crimes than victims of assault without any motivation of bias. With respect to the hate 
crime conditions, there are two theoretical explanations for the specific pattern of results across 
the four levels of religion. 
Theoretical explanation 1. The theoretical perspective of in-groups and out-groups 
(Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014) could explain participant verdict decisions and guilt 
judgments, such that participants will be more likely to render a guilty verdict when the victim is 
a member of their religious in-group, Christianity (see Figure 1). Past research (Devine, 1989) 
has shown that participants have negative stereotypes of out-group members. Therefore, this 
theoretical explanation argues that the Muslim or Jewish victims will receive a fewer percentage 
of guilty verdicts than when the victim is Christian. Finally, because past research has shown that 
Christians have very unfavorable attitudes toward Atheists (Galen, Williams, & Ver Wey, 2014), 
I predict that of the hate crime conditions, participants will render the lowest percentage of guilty 
verdicts when the victim is an Atheist. 
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Theoretical explanation 2. An alternative explanation for the main effect of victim 
religion on participant verdict decisions and guilt ratings is that the perceived frequency that each 
of the represented religious groups is targeted in hate crimes impacts their verdict (see Figure 2). 
Based on the FBI’s UCR (2014) data, participants should report Jews and Muslims as the most 
commonly targeted religions in hate crimes and thus these religions will receive the highest 
frequency of hate crime verdicts. While the UCR shows that a very low percentage (0.6%) of 
hate crimes are perpetrated against Atheists, participants may falsely believe that they are 
targeted more often than Christians because they are considered an out-group to all religions. 
However, previous research (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011) has also shown that distrust 
of Atheists leads to a prejudice against that group, which could lead to a lower frequency of 
guilty verdicts when the victim identifies himself as an Atheist.  
Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis states that participant responses to the rating questions will 
mediate the relationship between victim religion and their verdict decisions. If the first 
theoretical explanation, that participants are more likely to render a guilty verdict when the 
victim is a member of their religious in-group, best explains the main effect of victim religion on 
verdict decisions, then the rating questions that identify participant stereotypes should mediate 
this relationship. Specifically, it is hypothesized that participant responses to “In general, how 
much do you like Christian/Jewish/Muslim/Atheist people” and “How aggressive do you think 
Christian/Jewish/Muslim/Atheist people are” should mediate the relationship between victim 
religion and participant verdict decisions. If participants rate how much they like a particular 
religion as low, and believe that people of that religion are violent, it will be assumed that they 
have a negative stereotype of that religion. 
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If the second theoretical explanation, that the frequency that each of the religious groups 
is targeted in hate crimes best explains the main effect of victim religion on verdict decisions, 
participant perceptions of the frequency that each of the four religious groups is targeted in hate 
crimes should mediate this relationship. Specifically, participant responses to “Please report the 
percentage of hate crimes perpetrated because of religious identity that occur against each of the 
four religious groups (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Atheist)” will be tested as the potential 
mediator. 
 Participant perceptions of the victim and defendant should also mediate the relationship 
between victim religion and participant verdict. Past research has shown that mock juror 
perceptions of the defendant and victim impact their verdict decisions (Magyarics, Lynch, 
Golding, & Lippert, 2015). Additionally, Rayburn et al. (2003) argue that perceptions of the 
defendant and victim in a hate crime scenario are critical in understanding participant 
interpretations of legal decisions and punishment. Important rating variables include blame for 
the defendant, violence of the victim and defendant, and trustworthiness of the victim (Rayburn 
et al., 2003). In hate crime cases, the defendant’s bias is another critical measure of participant 
perceptions because it is participants’ interpretations of the defendant’s bias that creates the 
distinction between a regular crime (e.g., assault, arson) and a hate crime. In the present study, I 
believe that participant perceptions of the blame for the defendant, violence of the victim and 
defendant, trustworthiness of the victim, and bias of the defendant will be critical in 
understanding participant verdict decisions.  
Hypothesis 3. Networks will be created to show the specific aspects of the case that participants 
perceive to be most relevant to their verdict decision-making, which will be dependent on their 
perceptions of the victim and defendant and the victim’s religious identity. For example, the 
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conditions receiving the highest percentage of hate crime guilty verdicts will show a higher 
frequency of bias-centered reasons for verdict compared to the conditions receiving a lower 
percentage of guilty verdicts. Mock juror’s reason(s) for verdict will be analyzed using 
MATLAB analyses (Schvaneveldt, 1990) in order to provide a visual depiction of the way in 
which the victim’s religion and defendant’s behavior impact verdict decision-making. The 
networks allow for a representation of mock jurors’ mental processes in a visual network. 
Pathfinder networks (PFNETs) have an advantage over other text-based network derivation 
methods (e.g. co-occurrence networks, nearest neighbor networks, cut-off networks) in that they 
reveal psychologically salient relations in the link structure (Cooke, Durso, & Schvaneveldt, 
1986; Goldsmith, Johnson, & Acton, 1991; Schvaneveldt, 1990). 
The hypothesis that conditions receiving a high percentage of hate crime verdicts will 
have more bias-related nodes than conditions receiving fewer hate crime verdicts should be 
supported by a network having central nodes such as “bias”, “hatred”, “prejudice”, and 
“intolerance”. A central node is one that appears in the center of the network and that 
participants mention as being critical to their verdict decision. The networks for the conditions 
receiving a high percentage of hate crime verdicts should also have a higher frequency of bias-
related nodes than the conditions receiving a lower percentage of hate crime verdicts. 
Additional Analyses. Additionally, participants’ agreement with sentence enhancement for 
those convicted of hate crimes and sympathy toward the victim should mediate the relationship 
between victim religion and participant verdict decisions. Previous research (Cramer et al., 2013) 
has shown that agreeing with the Sentencing Enhancement Act led to a greater likelihood to 






Participants were 340 Christian community members recruited through Mechanical Turk 
(www.mturk.com; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants were 18 years of age and 
citizens of the United States. Nine participants were eliminated from analyses for incorrectly 
answering the manipulation check questions. Two additional participants were eliminated for 
reporting that they were not Christian. The sample consisted of 144 males and 185 females. The 
sample was 81% Caucasian, 11% African American, 5% Hispanic, 2% Asian, and 1% other 
races. 
Design 
I employed a 2 (participant gender) x 5 (victim religion) between-participants design. The 
four levels of victim religion include a Jewish, Muslim, Christian, or Atheist man who was the 
victim of the alleged hate crime. An additional condition, the control condition, was included 
where the victim’s religion was not mentioned and the defendant was only charged with assault. 
Materials 
Trial Summary. Participants read a trial summary based on State of New Jersey v. Mark 
Anthony where the defendant was accused of assaulting the victim and targeting him because of 
his religion (see Appendix A). In the control condition, the details of the trial were identical to 
those presented in the hate crime conditions, but there was no mention of the victim’s religion or 
of a hate crime. For the hate crime conditions, the trial summary was identical except for the 
victim’s religion and the racial slurs used by the defendant. The presentation of these slurs by the 
Prosecution is to argue that bias was the defendant’s primary motivation for committing the 
crimes. The trial summary described an aggravated assault that occurred on the victim’s property 
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when the defendant and victim were arguing over prejudiced comments made by the defendant. 
The Prosecution’s case argued that the defendant had verbally harassed the victim in the past 
because of the victim’s religion and that the victim was justified in shoving the defendant 
because the defendant was approaching his property. In addition, the Prosecution accused the 
defendant of picking up a metal baseball bat from the victim’s yard and hitting the victim on the 
side with it. The trial summary reported that the victim sustained serious injuries including a 
fractured rib and severe bruising. The Defense’s case argued that the defendant acted in self-
defense after the victim shoved him and threatened to call the police. 
Additional witnesses include a neighbor of the victim and defendant who testified for the 
Prosecution saying that he had been witness to the defendant’s hateful comments toward the 
victim. The Defense called a friend of the defendant as their additional witness who testified that 
the defendant is not a violent person and would not intentionally harm the victim just because of 
his religion. The Prosecution and Defense each provided closing arguments that aim to convince 
mock jurors that the defendant either was (former) or was not (latter) primarily motivated by 
bias. Participants read the Judge’s instructions of what is required for each verdict before they 
chose between three verdict decisions: Not Guilty, Guilty of Aggravated Assault, or Guilty of 
Aggravated Assault motivated by bias (hate crime). 
Victim Names and Bias Phrases. The victim’s name, as well as the hateful comments 
made by the defendant throughout the trail summary varied based on the victim’s religion. The 
names were stereotypical names, and the racial slurs were taken from actual hate crime incidents 
(Lawson & Henderson, 2009). The Muslim victim, Farhal Ali, was referred to as “Bin Laden”, 
“towel-head”, or “slurpee-slinger”. Seth Goldman, the Jewish victim, was referred to as a “penny 
chaser”, “Jesus killer”, or a “German candle”. The Atheist victim, Steven Watson, was referred 
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to as a “bible-burner”, “God-hater”, or “Devil worshipper”. Finally, the Christian victim, 
William Anderson, was referred to as a “Quaker”, “bible-basher”, or “holy roller”. 
 Legislation and Judge’s Instructions. A statute from the State of New Jersey (NJSA 
2C:16-1) was used to present the case. This statute allowed participants to choose between three 
verdict decisions; not guilty, guilty of the primary crime (assault), or guilty of assault primarily 
motivated by bias (hate crime), where an increase in the sentence is the primary difference 
between the defendant being guilty of the Assault charges and the Assault charges motivated by 
bias. Participants in the control condition were presented with two verdict decisions: not guilty or 
guilty of aggravated assault. At the end of the trial summary, participants were presented with 
the following Judge’s instructions, which described the necessary elements for a guilty verdict 
for each of the two charge options (guilty of assault or guilty of a hate crime). Participants in the 
control condition will only receive the Judge’s instructions for aggravated assault: 
Aggravated Assault: Bodily Injury with a Deadly Weapon 
NJSA 2C:12-1b(2) 
To find the defendant guilty of causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following elements: 
1. That the defendant caused bodily injury to another; and 
2. That the defendant caused the bodily injury by use of a deadly weapon; and 
3. That the defendant acted purposely or knowingly. 
By definition, a deadly weapon is any firearm or weapon, device, instrument, material or 
substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used 





A person is guilty of the crime of bias intimidation if he commits, attempts to commit, conspires 
with another to commit, or threatens the immediate commission of an offense 
1. With a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, 
color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, or ethnicity; or 
2. Knowing that the conduct constituting the offense would cause an individual or group 
of individuals to be intimidated because of race, color, religion, gender, handicap, 
sexual orientation, or ethnicity; or 
3. Under circumstances that caused any victim of the underlying offense to be 
intimidated and the victim, considering the manner in which the offense was 
committed, reasonably believed either that (a) the offense was committed with a 
purpose to intimidate the victim or any person or entity in whose welfare the victim is 
interested because of race, color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, or 
ethnicity, or (b) the victim or the victim’s property was selected to be the target of the 
offense because of the victim’s race, color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual 
orientation, or ethnicity.  
If participants did not find that each of the necessary elements from the bias intimidation statute 
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Prosecution, they rendered either a verdict of 
not guilty or guilty of aggravated assault (without bias). 
Rating Questions. Participants were asked to respond to a series of rating questions on a 
scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely). All rating questions appeared in the same order for 
all participants (see Appendix B). 
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Religious rating questions. Prior to reading the trial summary, all participants reported 
their general attitudes toward the four religions represented in the present study. These questions 
were presented prior to the trial because it simulates the reality of the jury selection process in 
which potential jurors receive questions about any bias prior to being selected as a jury member. 
Additionally, I believe that participants were likely not primed to think negatively toward the 
victim’s particular religion in their condition because all participants answered questions about 
each of the four religious groups represented in the present study. Participants reported their own 
religious affiliation and their level of religiosity. Finally, in order to measure the perceived 
frequency of hate crimes against each of the four represented religious groups, participants 
reported their belief of the percentage of hate crimes perpetrated against each of the four 
religious groups represented in the present study. 
Verdict and legislation rating questions. After reading the trial summary, participants 
rendered a verdict and explained why they chose their verdict in an open-ended format. 
Participants rated how confident they were in their verdict decision and how guilty the defendant 
was on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely). Additionally, participants reported whether 
they agree or disagree with the sentencing enhancement for hate crimes (see Cramer et al., 2013). 
Trial rating questions. Participants rated the sympathy that they felt toward both the 
victim and defendant as well as the amount of blame the victim and defendant should receive. 
Additionally, participants rated how much they believed the victim and defendant’s actions were 
motivated by bias, as well as the capability of each party to cause serious bodily harm to the 
other person. In order to measure how participants perceive the victim and defendant in terms of 
religious stereotypes, participants rated both the victim and defendant on how greedy, violent, 




Participants accessed the study via their accounts on Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com; 
Buhrmester et al., 2011). After reading a short description of the study, participants completed an 
online consent form that directed them to the trial transcript. The trial transcript was on the 
University of Kentucky’s Qualtrics website (www.uky.qualtrics.com). Prior to reading the trial 
summary, participants were asked to respond to the religious bias rating questions where they 
were asked to report their attitudes toward each of the four religious groups represented in the 
present study along with their own religious identity (see Appendix B). Participants then read a 
brief summary of the trial. Participants were asked a series of manipulation check questions (e.g., 
identifying the relationship between the victim and defendant) throughout the trial summary in 
order to test their understanding of the trial. 
At the end of the trial summary, participants rendered a verdict. Participants had a choice 
between Not Guilty, Guilty of Aggravated Assault, and Aggravated Assault primarily motivated 
by bias as their verdict. Next, participants explained why they chose their verdict in an open-
ended format. Participants then answered a series of trial rating questions (see Appendix B) 
regarding their attitudes toward the victim and defendant. Finally, participants were directed to 
an explanation webpage that provides a description of the true purpose of the study (see 
Appendix C). 
Results 
 The present study aimed to understand how jurors use aspects of a criminal hate crime 
case and the individuals involved in the case to choose a verdict. In order to best understand how 
the data explains the hypotheses, data from participants who rendered a verdict of not guilty and 
participants in the control condition will not be included in future analyses. With regard to the 
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former, only 7.5% of participants rendered a verdict of not guilty, which would have made it 
difficult to gain insight into the reasoning behind their decision-making. With regard to the latter, 
participants in the control condition were not given the opportunity to render a hate crime verdict 
because the defendant was only charged with assault, so this condition did not allow for direct 
comparison to the hate crime conditions. 
Additionally, I hypothesized that the control condition would receive fewer guilty 
verdicts than the hate crime conditions overall. As predicted, the results showed that the control 
condition received fewer guilty verdicts (88%) than the four hate crime conditions (94%). From 
these results, it can be stated that the defendant in the control condition was perceived as being 
nearly as guilty as the defendant in the hate crime conditions. However, the defendant in the hate 
crime conditions’ bias led to an increase in hate crime verdicts overall (54.3%) compared to the 
frequency of assault verdicts (39.2%) rendered in the hate crime conditions.  
 Hypothesis 1. I hypothesized that the victim’s religion would have a significant influence 
on participants’ decisions to render a hate crime verdict. This effect could potentially be 
explained by one of two proposed theoretical explanations. The first theoretical explanation was 
that participants would be most likely to render a hate verdict when the victim was a member of 
their religious in-group, Christianity. The second theoretical explanation stated that participants 
would be most likely to render a hate verdict if they believed the victim’s religious group was 
commonly targeted in religious-motivated hate crimes. I used logistic regression to test the 
hypothesis that the victim’s religion would influence participant verdict decisions. The analyses 
controlled for participant demographics including age, race, marital status, political orientation, 
and experience serving on a jury at Step 1. Gender and condition (victim religion) were entered 
at Step 2 of the model. The control variables entered at Step 1 were all found to be non-
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significant predictors of participant verdict decisions. Although not hypothesized, participant 
gender is often a significant predictor of verdict decisions, specifically female participants are 
more likely to render a guilty verdict in victimization cases (Magyarics et al., 2015; Jimenez & 
Abreu, 2003). Results showed that gender was not a significant predictor of verdict decisions, B 
= 0.33, SE = .27, p = .22. This finding was consistent with past hate crime juror decision-making 
literature that did not discuss a participant gender difference for perceptions of hate crimes 
(Cramer et al., 2014; Plumm, Terrance & Austin, 2014). 
The logistic regression analyses confirmed Hypothesis 1 that the victim’s religion would 
have a significant effect on participant verdict decisions, B(1) = .24, SE = .12, p = .045. More 
specifically, participants rendered a similar percentage of hate verdicts when the victim was an 
Atheist (50%) and Christian (49%) while an increase in hate crime verdicts occurred when the 





Figure 1. Percentage of hate crime verdicts rendered in each of the four hate crime 
conditions. 
In order to understand the relationship between the four hate crime conditions in terms of 
how likely each condition’s defendant was to receive a verdict of either assault or hate, dummy 
coding was used in subsequent logistic regression analyses. The results, when using the Christian 
victim as the reference condition (see Figure 2), showed that the Jewish victim was significantly 
more likely to receive a hate verdict, B(1) = .95, SE = .39, p = .016, CI = 1.20 to 5.55. The 
Atheist victim, B(1) = .02, SE = .38, p = .97, CI = .48 to 2.13 and Muslim victim, B(1) = .50, SE 
= .37, p = .17, CI = .80 to 3.42, were not found to be significantly different from the Christian 
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Figure 2. Logistic regression analyses with the Christian condition as the reference 
group. 
Further analyses used the Jewish victim as the reference condition because this condition 
received the highest percentage of hate crime verdicts and was the only victim significantly more 
likely to receive a hate crime than the Christian victim. These logistic regression analyses 
showed that both the Atheist victim, B(1) = -.93 SE = .39, p = .017, CI = .18 to .85 and the 
Christian victim, B(1) = -.95, SE = .39, p = .016, CI = .18 to .84 were significantly less likely to 
receive a hate crime verdict than the Jewish victim (see Figure 3). With the Jewish victim as the 
reference group, the Muslim victim was not significantly different from the Jewish victim in 
terms of the likelihood that the defendant would be convicted of a hate crime, B(1) = -.45, SE = 




Figure 3. Logistic regression analyses with the Jewish condition as the reference group. 
The finding that the Jewish victim was most likely to have the defendant convicted of a 
hate crime cannot be explained by the first theoretical explanation, that participants would be 
most likely to render a hate verdict when the victim was a member of their religious in-group. If 
theoretical explanation 1 explained the effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions, 
the Christian victim would have received significantly more hate crime verdicts than any of the 
other three hate crime conditions. However, the results show partial support for theoretical 
explanation 2. Specifically, although not significantly different, 62% of participants in the 
Muslim victim condition rendered a hate crime verdict compared to 70% of participants in the 
Jewish victim condition rendering a hate crime verdict. This high percentage of hate crime 
verdicts for the Muslim victim shows partial support for theoretical explanation 2, that 
participants would be more likely to render a hate verdict if they perceived the victim’s religious 
group as being commonly targeted in religion-motivated hate crimes. Participants perceived 
Muslims to be the most commonly targeted religious group in hate crimes (see Figure 4), which 
provided partial support for theoretical explanation 2. However, if theoretical explanation 2 fully 
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explained the effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions, the Muslim victim would 
have received significantly more hate verdicts than the Jewish victim. 
 
Figure 4. Participant perceptions of the frequency that each of the four religious groups is 
targeted in religion-motivated hate crimes. 
Hypothesis 2. The mediation analyses in Hypothesis 2 were dependent on the theoretical 
explanation that best explained the main effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions 
in Hypothesis 1. Although neither theoretical explanation fully explained the results from 
Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 also stated that the relationship between a victim’s religion and 
participant verdict decision would be mediated by their perceptions of the victim and defendant. 
Therefore, the mediation analyses focused on identifying the rating variables that best explain the 
results from Hypothesis 1, which showed that Christian participants were significantly more 
likely to render a hate verdict when the victim was Jewish than any of the other out-group hate 
crime conditions. 
The means for all rating variables in each of the four hate crime conditions are presented 







and trustworthiness of the victim) are critical in understanding participant perceptions of the 
victim and defendant in a hate crime scenario (Rayburn et al., 2003) and were included in 
contrast and mediation analyses. Measures of perceptions and attributions of blame help interpret 
the participants’ interpretation of the case in terms of their legal decision of a perpetrator’s 
punishment (Fiegenson & Park, 2006; Rayburn et al., 2003). Although not included in Rayburn 
et al.’s Perceptions of Perpetrator and Victims Blame Scale, participant perceptions of the 
defendant’s bias are necessary to understand participant verdict decisions in a hate crime case. If 
the defendant was primarily motivated by his bias toward the victim in a hate crime case, this 
establishes the difference between a regular crime (i.e., assault, arson) and a hate crime.  
Together, these five rating variables (defendant blame, violence of the victim and 
defendant, trustworthiness of the victim, and defendant bias) were analyzed in terms of the 
difference between the Jewish victim and the other three hate crime conditions. This contrast was 
chosen because the Jewish victim received the highest percentage of hate crime verdicts and was 
the only condition significantly more likely to receive a hate verdict than the participants’ 
religious in-group victim, Christianity. One-way ANOVA contrasts were conducted to identify 
significant differences in participant ratings of the victim and defendant in the Jewish victim 
condition versus the other three hate crime conditions. 
 The results showed that participant perceptions of the Jewish victim were significantly 
different for four of the five analyzed rating variables; defendant blame, F244) = 4.90, p = .028, 
victim violence, F(244) = 4.91, p = .028, trustworthiness of the victim, F(244) = 9.48, p = .002, 
and defendant bias, F(244) = 12.42, p = .001. The results showed a marginal difference in the 
rating of the defendant’s violence in the Jewish victim condition compared to the other three hate 





Participant ratings of the victim and defendant. 
 
Variable  Atheist   Christian           Jewish                    Muslim 
Guilt      8.3      8.8      9.1            8.7 
 
Victim Blame     4.5      4.0      3.7            4.0 
Victim Sympathy    5.9      6.3      7.2            6.1 
Victim Bias     4.5      5.0      4.7            4.5 
Victim Harm     5.6      5.1      4.4            5.0 
Victim Greed     2.8      2.5      1.6            2.4 
Victim Violence    3.9      3.7      2.8            3.2 
Victim Morality    5.1      4.8      5.9            5.3 
Victim Trustworthy    5.3      4.9      6.3            5.6 
 
Defendant Blame    7.9      7.9      8.5            7.9 
Defendant Sympathy    2.7      2.3      2.1            2.5 
Defendant Bias    6.2      5.8      7.9            7.2 
Defendant Harm    8.4      8.0      8.8            8.4 
Defendant Greed    3.5      4.0      4.2            3.9 
Defendant Violence    7.7      7.8      8.2            7.6 
Defendant Morality    3.3      2.9      2.5            3.1 
Def. Trustworthy    3.6      2.9      2.7            3.4 
 
To test whether these rating variables (defendant blame, violence of the victim and 
defendant, trustworthiness of the victim, and defendant bias) explained the relationship between 
a victim’s religious identity and participant verdict decisions, mediation analyses were 
conducted. These mediation analyses used Model 4 in Process version 2.13 (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004). The Jewish dummy variable was entered as the X variable, verdict as the Y variable, and 
the Atheist and Muslim dummies as covariates. Thus, the Christian dummy variable acted as the 
reference group for the mediation analyses. This model showed differences between the Jewish 
and Christian conditions in terms of the perceptions of the five analyzed rating variables and how 
these perceptions led to the difference in participant verdict decisions between the Christian and 
Jewish conditions. Additionally, because the participants in the present study were all Christian, 
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it offered a unique perspective into perceptions of the victim who was either a religious in-group 
or out-group member. 
Significant mediation occurs when the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence 
interval (CI) do not cross zero. Two of the analyzed rating variables mediated the relationship 
between the Jewish and Christian conditions and participant verdict decisions. The two variables 
found to mediate the relationship between victim religion (Jewish or Christian) and participant 
verdict decisions are victim trustworthiness (indirect effect size: .40; 95% CI: .13 to .78; see 
Figure 5) and defendant bias (indirect effect size: 2.36; 95% CI: 1.17 to 3.58; see Figure 6). 
 
 Note. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
Figure 5. Victim trustworthiness mediating the relationship between the Jewish and 




Note. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
Figure 6. Defendant bias mediating the relationship between the Jewish and Christian 
conditions and participant verdict decisions. 
The mediation results showed that participants viewed the Jewish victim as being more 
trustworthy than the Christian victim and the defendant in the Jewish condition as being more 
biased than the defendant in the Christian condition, which resulted in more hate crime verdicts 
for the Jewish victim than the Christian victim. The mediation results were also supported by the 
rating variable analyses that showed participants viewed the Jewish victim as the most 
trustworthy and the defendant in the Jewish condition as the most biased defendant, which led to 
the highest percentage of hate crime verdicts for the Jewish victim. Both the participant rating 
variables and the mediation results showed how differences in perceptions of the defendant and 
victim influenced the likelihood of rendering a hate crime verdict, specifically that participants in 
the Jewish condition were most likely to render a hate crime verdict.  
Hypothesis 3. It was hypothesized that the network for the assault verdicts would have 
central nodes showing that participants believe the defendant’s behavior was not motivated by 
bias. On the other hand, the networks for the hate verdict network would have central nodes 
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focusing on the defendant’s bias toward the victim because of the victim’s religion. Participants’ 
open-ended responses explaining how they chose their verdict were analyzed using MATLAB 
analyses. Two networks were constructed to visualize participants’ mental processes in choosing 
their verdict, one network for participants who chose an assault verdict and one for participants 
who chose a hate verdict. The Pathfinder networks (PFNETs) created using MATLAB showed 
support for the hypotheses that participants used their perceptions of the defendant’s bias toward 
the victim to decide whether they would render a verdict of guilty of assault alone or guilty of 
assault motivated by bias (i.e., hate crime). Figure 7 shows the network derived from participants 
who rendered an assault verdict. This network has a central node “religious” that is closely 
connected to “was not” and “do not believe” showing that participants frequently believed that 
the defendant was not motivated by his bias against the victim. Additionally, nodes such as 
“defense” and “assault” are nearly central to the network, meaning that participants who 
rendered an assault verdict believe the defendant was acting in self-defense and therefore should 




Figure 7. PFNET for participants who rendered a guilty of assault verdict. 
 Participants who believed the defendant was guilty of a hate crime frequently explained 
their verdict using terms such as “racist”, “weapon”, and “religion”, meaning that these 
participants believed the defendant was motivated by his bias toward the victim because of the 
victim’s religious identity (see Figure 8). Further, the central node “religion” is closely related to 
“hate crime” and “believe” showing that participants believe the defendant’s actions should be 
classified as a hate crime because his religious bias primarily motivated the assault. The PFNETs 
constructed both have central nodes of “religion”, but different nodes surrounding “religion” 
which shows that all participants were aware of the defendant’s alleged bias toward the victim 
and they chose their verdict based on whether they believed the defendant’s actions were 




Figure 8. PFNET for reason-for-verdict data from participants who rendered a hate crime verdict. 
Additional Analyses. In support of past research (Cramer et al., 2013), the present study showed 
that participants who agreed with the Sentencing Enhancement Act were more likely to render a 
hate crime verdict than participants who reported that they did not agree with the Sentencing 
Enhancement Act. The logistic regression analyses controlled for participant age, gender, race, 
marital status, jury experience, and political affiliation at Step 1. At Step 2 of the analyses, 
participant agreement with the Sentencing Enhancement Act significantly predicted the 
likelihood that they would render a hate verdict over an assault verdict, OR = 2.55,  p = .002, CI 
= 1.40 to 4.69. Specifically, participants who reported that they agreed with the Sentencing 
Enhancement Act rendered a hate verdict twice as often as those who reported they did not agree 
with the Sentencing Enhancement Act. 
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To identify whether participants’ agreement with the Sentencing Enhancement Act 
eliminated the effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions, separate logistic 
regression analyses were conducted. Participant demographics including age, gender, race, 
marital status, political affiliation, experience serving on a jury, and their agreement with the 
Sentencing Enhancement Act were entered in Step 1. Participant agreement with the Sentencing 
Enhancement Act was again found to have a significant influence on participant verdict 
decisions, B(1) = .94, SE = 0.31 p = .002, CI = 1.40 to 4.69. Condition was entered at Step 2, and 
was still found to be a significant predictor of participant verdict decisions, even controlling for 
participant agreement with the Sentencing Enhancement Act, B(1) = .24, SE = 0.12 p = .047, CI 
= 1.00 to 1.61. Therefore, participant agreement with the Sentencing Enhancement Act was 
found to have significant influence on their verdict decisions, but did not eliminate the effect of 
the victim’s religion on verdict decisions. 
Discussion 
The present study investigated mock juror perceptions of a religion-motivated hate crime 
case in which the victim’s religion was manipulated. I hypothesized that Christian participant 
verdict decisions would be affected by the victim’s religion. Specifically, participants would be 
more likely to render a hate crime verdict when the victim was a member of their religious in-
group (Cikara et al., 2014) or if they perceived the victim’s religion as being commonly targeted 
in religious-motivated hate crimes (FBI Uniform Crime Report, 2014). The results showed that 
Christian participants were most likely to render a hate crime verdict when the victim was 
Jewish. Although neither theoretical explanation supported the present study’s findings, 
mediation analyses showed that perceptions of the defendant’s bias and the victim’s 
trustworthiness influenced the difference in hate crime verdicts rendered between the Christian 
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and Jewish conditions. The networks also showed that participants’ interpretations of the 
defendant’s bias influenced their verdict decisions, by having central nodes regarding the 
defendants’ bias. The present results have implications for better understanding how jurors 
interpret hate crime legislation and how characteristics of the victim and defendant can influence 
juror interpretation of the law. 
One of the primary results, that the Jewish victim received the highest percentage of hate 
crime verdicts, was not directly supported by either of the theoretical explanations for 
Hypothesis 1. The first theoretical explanation, that participants would be more likely to render a 
hate crime verdict when the victim was a member of their religious in-group, was thought to 
explain Hypothesis 1 because past research has shown that Christians have more favorable 
perceptions (less violent and more trustworthy) of religious in-group members than religious out-
group members (Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2011; LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, & Finkle, 2012; 
Rowatt et al., 2013). If this theoretical explanation significantly predicted the main effect of 
victim religion on participant verdict decisions, the Christian victim would have received the 
highest percentage of hate crime verdicts. However, the present results showed that Christian 
participants rendered significantly more hate crime verdicts for the Jewish victim, an out-group 
religious member, than the Christian victim, the in-group religious member. However, this out-
group favoritism did not hold true when the victim was Muslim or an Atheist, in which the 
victim was also a religious out-group member. The Christian participants may have perceived the 
Jewish victim as being a different type of out-group member than the Muslim and Atheist victim. 
Past research has identified out-group favoritism when a disadvantaged group (e.g., African 
Americans) favors a socially advantaged group such as Caucasians (Ashburn-Nardo & Johnson, 
2008; Dasgupta, 2004). However, the present results show an historically advantaged group’s 
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(Christian) favoritism for an historically disadvantaged out-group. The Christian favoritism of 
Jews found in the present study may be a function of the Christian participants’ awareness of 
anti-Semitism in the United States or the belief that Jews are often targeted in hate crimes. The 
Christian participants may have believed Jews are often more similar to Christians in terms of 
appearance and religious beliefs compared to the other religious out-groups. 
The second theoretical explanation also failed to explain the result which showed that, 
although not significant, the Muslim victim received more hate crime verdicts than the Christian 
victim. Although the second theoretical explanation did not explain this finding, it supports past 
research showing a Christian favoritism for their religious in-group over Muslims. Rowatt, 
Franklin, & Cotton (2005) used an Implicit Association Task methodology to identify Christian 
participants’ perceptions of Muslims and Christians. This study revealed that Christians self-
reported a favoritism for Christians over Muslims, this pattern was also supported by the Implicit 
Association results. If the second theoretical explanation had explained the present study’s main 
effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions, the Muslim victim would have received 
the highest percentage of hate crime verdicts. Overall, participants perceived Muslims as being 
the most commonly targeted religious group in religion-motivated hate crimes, they perceived 
Jews as being the second-most commonly targeted religious group. Therefore, although 
participants overall perceived Muslims as being commonly targeted in religious hate crimes, the 
Christian preference for Christianity over Islam may have prevented the Muslim victim from 
receiving the highest percentage of guilty verdicts. Although theoretical explanation 2 did not 
sufficiently explain the main effect of victim religion on verdict decisions, it can offer insight 
into how participant perceptions of the frequency that the religious group are targeted is related 
to the likelihood that each of the religious groups received a hate crime verdict because the 
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Muslim victim received more hate crime verdicts than the Christian victim, despite the fact that 
the Muslim victim was a religious out-group member. 
With respect to the hate crime verdicts rendered for the Atheist victim, the hypothesized 
main effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions was confirmed. As hypothesized, 
the Atheist victim received the lowest percentage of guilty verdicts, which is likely the function 
of the prejudice and distrust of Atheists (Gervais et al., 2011). Atheists are also considered a 
religious out-group to all religious people because they do not believe in a higher power. 
Additionally, the Christian participants perceived Atheists as being the least commonly targeted 
group in religion-motivated hate crimes. The Christian participants may have perceived the 
Atheist victim as being the least relatable out-group victim and did not feel that the victim was 
likely to be the target of a religion-motivated hate crime. Thus, theoretical explanations 1 and 2 
can be used to support the finding that the Atheist victim was least likely to receive a hate crime 
verdict.  
Although neither theoretical explanation completely explained the hypothesized main 
effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions, rating variables and mediation analyses 
were still valuable in explaining the present study’s results; thus Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Specifically, the high percentage of hate crime verdicts rendered for the Jewish victim compared 
to the other victims can be explained with the rating variables, which showed that participants 
perceived the Jewish victim as being less violent and more trustworthy than the other victims. 
Participants also viewed the defendant in the Jewish victim condition as being more 
blameworthy, more violent, and more biased than the defendants in the other hate crime 
conditions. Past research (Rayburn et al., 2003; Cramer et al., 2013) emphasized the importance 
of measuring participant perceptions of the victim and defendant in a victimization case. In a 
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hate crime case, it is of particular importance to measure participant perceptions of the 
defendant’s bias because it is the defendant’s bias that establishes the difference between a 
regular crime (i.e., assault, arson) and a hate crime. 
The present study’s results supported this emphasis on perceptions of a defendant’s bias 
by showing that participant perceptions of the defendant’s bias mediated the relationship 
between victim religion (Christian and Jewish) and participant verdict decisions. The results also 
showed that perceptions of the victim’s trustworthiness significantly mediated the relationship 
between the victim’s religion and participant verdict decisions between the Christian and Jewish 
conditions. Specifically, the Jewish victim was perceived as being more trustworthy than the 
Christian victim and the defendant in the Jewish condition was perceived as being more biased 
than the defendant in the Christian condition. These perceptions led to the highest percentage of 
hate crime verdicts in the Jewish condition. From these results, it can be stated that participant 
perceptions of the victim and defendant, specifically the victim’s trustworthiness and the 
defendant’s bias, significantly influenced participant verdict decisions.  
In addition to using mediation analyses to explain verdict decisions, participants’ mental 
processes, which showed that interpretations of a defendant’s bias influenced verdict decisions. 
Participants’ mental processes and interpretations of the case details used to render a verdict 
were displayed using networks created with MATLAB. If participants were not given the 
opportunity to explain their verdict in their own words, the interpretation of their verdict 
decisions would be limited to the participants’ responses to the rating questions. For example, 
participants may find different aspects of the case (e.g., relationship between defendant and 
victim) critical to their verdict decisions and some of these case characteristics may not be 
directly discussed using the rating variables. The open-ended question allowed participants to 
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explain their verdict decision using the language they find appropriate. The PFNETs provide a 
visual interpretation of all participants’ reason-for-verdict data, including the most frequently 
mentioned phrases. Other methods for analyzing reason data have only shown the frequency that 
a particular word or phrase was mentioned, but was not able to show how closely these phrases 
were related (Hodell, Wasarhaley, Lynch, & Golding, 2014). 
The networks created in the present study not only showed the most frequently 
mentioned phrases, but also how these phrases were mentioned in relation to each other. The two 
networks created for the present data provided a comparison between participants who chose an 
assault verdict versus participants who chose a hate crime verdict. The assault network showed 
that participants were aware of the defendant’s alleged bias, but did not believe that it was this 
alleged bias that led to the assault discussed in the trial. It is important to note that these 
participants still believe the defendant was responsible for the assault, as they chose a verdict of 
“guilty of assault” rather than “not guilty”. However, these participants believed that the 
defendant was acting in self-defense due to the comments made by the alleged victim, which 
prevented them from rendering a hate crime verdict. The assault network can be compared to the 
network created from participants who rendered a hate crime verdict. The hate crime network 
showed that those who rendered a hate crime verdict put emphasis on the defendant’s use of a 
deadly weapon and that his actions were primarily motivated by bias against the victim’s 
religion. In sum, the two networks showed that participants who did not believe the defendant 
was motivated by bias did not feel that the defendant should be charged with a hate crime while 
participants who believed that the defendant’s behavior was primarily motivated by bias 
rendered a hate crime verdict. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
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Although the present study provided a novel understanding of perceptions of hate crime 
in the courtroom, several limitations should be noted. First, an online survey paradigm was used. 
Online studies pose an issue to the validity of results because the environment in which the 
participants complete the study cannot be controlled. However, past research (Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava, & John, 2004) has shown that results from online and face-to-face studies do not 
differ significantly. Second, participants were not asked to deliberate. Although Diamond (1997) 
argued that jury deliberation is important because it allows participants to discuss any 
misunderstandings about the case, it was also stated that individual judgments are similar to 
group judgment decisions. While jury deliberation can be valuable, the present study was 
concerned with the jurors’ individual interpretations of the case and their judgments, rather than 
identifying group dynamics and the effect that deliberation has on jury decision-making. A future 
study may measure both individual judgments and a group decision in a hate crime case. This 
future study should also manipulate the religious identity of jury members in order to identify 
whether in-group/out-group relations would influence participants’ individual and group 
judgments. 
Third, the present study focused on hate crimes against an individual and excluded hate 
crimes against property. Although the present study was representative of a typical hate crime 
against an individual, about 36% of the religion-motivated hate crimes that occurred in 2014 
were crimes against property (FBI UCR, 2015). These crimes include the hate crimes that are 
often portrayed in the media in which places of worship such as a temple or mosque are 
vandalized by members of hate groups. Perceptions of crimes against property would likely 
differ from crimes against persons, in that harm done against a person may be seen as more 
destructive than harm against a building. However, crimes against a place of worship may be 
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more likely to instill fear in the targeted community than a crime against a single person. The 
increase in fear instilled in a targeted community may increase the likelihood that the community 
would seek justice. Future research should investigate perceptions of a hate crime in the 
courtroom that involves vandalism of places of worship. 
Fourth, the present participants were all members of the Christian faith. Although 
Christianity is the dominant faith in the United States (Pew Research, 2014), future research 
investigating perceptions of hate crimes would benefit from comparing perceptions of mock 
jurors with different religious beliefs. A future study using participants from all of the religious 
groups represented as victims in the present study would allow for a more thorough analysis of 
religious in-group/out-group dynamics. This study research could help reveal religious minority 
groups’ perceptions of religious in-groups and out-groups. 
Conclusions 
 The present study has implications that bridge law enforcement, psychology, sociology, 
and legislation. The minimal amount of psychological research that has been done regarding hate 
crimes in the courtroom has focused on sexual and racial minorities (Cramer et al., 2013; Plumm 
& Terrance, 2013; Plumm et al., 2014). Prior to the present study, psychology and law research 
had not yet looked at how jurors interpret religion-motivated hate crime cases in the courtroom. 
The present study sheds light on how Christian jurors interpret hate crimes committed against 
members of their religious in-group and religious out-groups. Although the present study’s 
results did not reflect past research concerning religious in-group/out-group dynamics which 
showed a Christian preference for their own religion (Johnson et al., 2011; LaBouff et al., 2012; 
Rowatt et al., 2013), it demonstrated how Christians interpreted bias-motivated crimes 
committed against different religions. This is of particular importance because the majority of 
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Americans report that they are Christian (Pew Research, 2014) and the majority of religion-
motivated hate crimes are committed against members of religions other than Christians (FBI 
UCR, 2014). The present study showed that participants used their perceptions of the case to 
interpret hate crime legislation and the Sentencing Enhancement Act, which helped them choose 
what they believed to be the proper verdict. From the present results and existing hate crime 
legislation, it is clear that perceptions of the victim’s trustworthiness and defendant’s bias are 
critical in understanding perceptions of hate crimes in the courtroom, which can be used to 






Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will assume the role of a juror as you read a 
trial summary. You will read a trial summary and then answer questions about it. You will not be 
able to change your responses once you move to the next page, so make sure you read the trial 
summary carefully enough that you will be able to answer questions about it. If you get a 
question correct, the trial summary will continue. If you answer a question wrong, the computer 
will inform you that you got the question wrong before continuing with the trial summary. You 
may exit the survey at any time. 
 
State of New Jersey v. Michael Campbell NJSA 2C:12-1b(2) and NJSA 2C:16-1 
The following is a summary of a criminal trial about the criminal assault of [victim’s name] by 
the defendant, Michael Campbell. It was alleged that the defendant, Michael Campbell, assaulted 
[victim’s name] with an aluminum baseball bat on August 14, 2014 on the victim’s property. The 
victim and defendant are neighbors and first met when their children began riding the same 
school bus to school. 
 
State of New Jersey v. Michael Campbell 
The State charged Mr. Campbell with Aggravated Assault in the Second Degree. The indictment 
also indicated that the assault would be tried as a “hate crime” pursuant to NJSA 2C:16-1. The 
State provided evidence that Mr. Campbell intentionally caused the victim serious physical 
injury with a deadly weapon. The defendant, Mr. Campbell, reportedly started making hateful 
comments, such as [biased comment], when the victim’s family moved to the defendant’s 
neighborhood. On the morning of the assault, the defendant followed the victim home after their 
children boarded the school bus. The victim sustained a fractured rib when the defendant swung 
at him with an aluminum baseball bat. The State called two witnesses for the prosecution: 
[Victim’s name] (the victim) and James Whitmore, a neighbor of the victim and defendant. 
 
State of New Jersey v. Michael Campbell 
Mr. Campbell pled not guilty to Aggravated Assault in the Second Degree, claiming that he was 
defending himself and his family when the victim threatened to have him arrested and have his 
children taken away from him. The defense provided evidence that Mr. Campbell was a loving 
father and law-abiding citizen, and that he should not be punished for defending his family or for 
exercising his constitutional right of free speech for making biased comments toward the victim. 
The Defense called two witnesses: Michael Campbell (the defendant) and Noah Baker (a friend 
of the defendant). 
 
Manipulation Check Question: The defendant, Michael Campbell was charged with which two 
crimes? 
 
Prosecution’s Case: First Witness, [Victim’s Name] 
Prosecution’s Case 





[Mr. Victim] stated that Michael Campbell, the defendant began making hateful comments to 
him and his family just a week after they moved into the defendant’s neighborhood, 
approximately six months ago. The victim stated that he believed the defendant had a bias 
against people of his religion, and that he was fearful of what the defendant might do to him or 
his family because of the defendant’s hatred. [Mr. Victim] recalled that Michael Campbell (the 
defendant) yelled “religious slur” at him on several occasions after their children got on the 
school bus.  
 
Manipulation Check Question: What was the relationship between [Mr. Victim] (the victim) and 
Mr. Campbell (the defendant)? 
 
Prosecution’s Case: First Witness, [Victim’s Name] 
Direct Examination (continued) 
The victim stated that on August 14, 2014, he and the defendant got in a verbal argument after 
their children boarded the bus to school. [Mr. Victim] reported that he had found an anonymous 
letter in his mailbox that read “other religious slur”, which he assumed was written by the 
defendant, because the defendant frequently made biased comments toward him. The victim 
reported that this letter made him fear for his and his family’s safety. The victim stated that he 
shoved the defendant at the bus stop after their children got on the bus and warned the defendant 
that he would call the police to have the defendant arrested. 
The victim stated that the defendant yelled “religious slur” as he walked away from the bus stop. 
Although [Mr. Victim] was unaware, the defendant, Mr. Campbell, began following the victim to 
his house. [Mr. Victim] testified that he became aware of Mr. Campbell’s presence on his 
property when the defendant loudly stated that he was allowed to hate people of particular 
religion because he lives in a free country, and that he would not allow his children to be taken 
from him. 
[Mr. Victim] then explained that Mr. Campbell picked up an aluminum bat from the victim’s 
front yard and swung it at him several times. The aluminum bat made contact with the victim’s 
left side, resulting in a fractured rib and severe bruising. 
 
Prosecution’s Case: First Witness, [Victim’s Name] 
Cross Examination 
[Mr. Victim] acknowledged that he did shove and confront the defendant, Michael Campbell, at 
the bus stop on the day of the assault, which likely instigated the verbal argument that occurred 
at the bus stop. [Mr. Victim] further acknowledged that he had no evidence showing that 
Michael Campbell was responsible for the threatening letter in his mailbox. Finally, [Mr. Victim] 
stated that he had never seen the defendant be physically violent with anyone before, and 
acknowledged that Mr. Campbell has a constitutional right to have bias against [victim’s 
religion].  
 
Prosecution’s Case: Second Witness, James Whitmore (Victim and Defendant’s Neighbor) 
Direct Examination 
Mr. Whitmore stated that he had been a neighbor of the defendant, Michael Campbell, for three 
years and a neighbor of the victim, [Victim’s Name], for six months when the victim first moved 
to the neighborhood. Mr. Whitmore explained that he had heard the defendant make hateful 
comments, such as [hateful comment] on a few occasions because his yard is adjacent to the bus 
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stop where the victim and defendant’s children get on the school bus. Mr. Whitmore stated that 
he had observed the defendant, Michael Campbell, become angry and violent several times in the 
past. Further, Mr. Whitmore explained that he had expressed his concern to the victim about the 
defendant’s capabilities of harm after the victim told him about the threatening letter, which they 
both assumed was written by the defendant. 
 
Manipulation Check Question: How was Mr. Whitmore aware of the hateful comments made by 
the defendant, Michael Campbell? 
 
Prosecution’s Case: Second Witness, James Whitmore (Victim and Defendant’s Neighbor) 
Cross Examination 
Mr. Whitmore stated that although he assumed the defendant, Michael Campbell, was 
responsible for writing the threatening letter in the victim’s mailbox, he did not have any proof 
that it was actually the defendant that wrote it. He further stated that he had never thought to 
confront the defendant about his comments about the victim because he never expected the 
defendant to become violent. Mr. Whitmore agreed that the victim, [Mr. Victim] might have 
instigated the physical argument when he threatened to report Mr. Campbell to the police. 
 
Defense’s Case: First Witness, Michael Campbell (defendant) 
Direct Examination 
The defendant, Michael Campbell, stated that the charges against him were a grave 
misunderstanding and that he did not target the victim, [Mr. Victim] because of his religion. Mr. 
Campbell stated that he was a law-abiding man who did not have a history of violence. Mr. 
Campbell further stated that [Mr. Victim] had an issue with him shortly after moving to the 
neighborhood because Mr. Campbell’s children would not play with the victim’s children. Mr. 
Campbell explained that the victim’s unnecessary comments about his children being brats for 
not playing with the victim’s children angered him, and caused him to say hateful and biased 
things to the victim, but that he never intended to get physically violent with the victim. 
 
Mr. Campbell stated that on the day of the assault, [Mr. Victim] started an argument because he 
was under the impression that Mr. Campbell and his children were being hateful and 
discriminatory against [Mr. Victim] and his children. Mr. Campbell became upset at the 
accusation and was extremely upset when [Mr. Victim] said he was going to call the police if the 
harassment continued. The defendant, Mr. Campbell stated that the victim, [Mr. Victim], shoved 
him in the street as they were walking away from the bus stop. Mr. Campbell stated that the 
argument certainly got out of hand, but that he was simply acting out of self-defense for himself 
and his children. Finally, Mr. Campbell stated that in no uncertain terms that he was not 
responsible for the hateful letter found in the victim’s mailbox. 
 
Manipulation Check Question: Mr. Campbell stated that his hateful comments began 
after______. 
 
Defense’s Case: First Witness, Michael Campbell (defendant) 
Cross Examination 
Mr. Campbell stated that he did not particularly like the victim and acknowledged that he had 
made hateful comments, such as comments about the victim being [victim’s religion], toward 
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him on several occasions. He further acknowledged that his comments, such as “Hateful 
comment” could certainly be taken as a threat to a person of that particular religion. Finally, Mr. 
Campbell stated that he did not believe the victim had a weapon when he chose to pick up the 
aluminum baseball bat for protection, and that perhaps the men could have solved the argument 
without violence. 
 
Defense’s Case: Second Witness, Noah Baker (coworker and friend of the defendant) 
Direct Examination 
Mr. Baker stated that he and the defendant, Michael Campbell, had been friends for about ten 
years after meeting at work. Mr. Baker stated that the defendant, Mr. Campbell, believed [Mr. 
Victim] was trying to start an argument with the defendant because their children did not play 
together. Mr. Baker further stated that the defendant, Mr. Campbell, had told him that several 
other families in the defendant and victim’s neighborhood had children who also did not play 
with the victim’s children. Therefore, Mr. Baker reported that he was unsure why the victim, 
[Mr. Victim] seemed to single out the defendant, Mr. Campbell. Finally, Mr. Baker stated that 
Mr. Campbell told him that the he was not responsible for the hateful letter in [Mr. Victim’s] 
mailbox. 
 
Defense’s Case: Second Witness, Noah Baker (coworker and friend of the defendant) 
Cross Examination 
Mr. Baker stated that he and the defendant, Michael Campbell, had joked about people of a 
certain religion on several occasions and that they were tired of these people taking over their 
community. Mr. Baker further stated that the injuries sustained by the victim, [Mr. Victim], were 
very severe and probably should have been avoided. Further, Mr. Baker stated that although the 
defendant, Michael Campbell, told him that he was not responsible for writing the hateful letter 
in the victim’s mailbox, Mr. Baker had no way of proving that Mr. Campbell was not responsible 
for writing the letter. 
 
Closing Arguments: Prosecution 
The Prosecution argued that the defendant, Michael Campbell, intended to cause the victim, [Mr. 
Victim] serious physical injury when he chose to swing an aluminum baseball bat toward the 
victim. Further, the Prosecution stated that the defendant, Michael Campbell, was aware that the 
victim did not have a weapon, but decided to disregard this fact and cause the victim serious 
physical injury. The Prosecution further argued that the defendant’s hatred and bias against 
people of a certain religion were the primary motivators for the defendant’s behavior. 
Specifically, the Prosecution argued that the defendant’s biased comments, such as [hateful 
comment] are evidence that the defendant had a biased attitude toward the victim, which was the 
reason he escalated the verbal argument to a physical argument. They further argued that the 
defendant’s decision to cause serious physical harm to the victim, [Mr. Victim], was primarily 
motivated by his bias against the victim’s religion. Finally, the Prosecution believes that living in 
the United States, a free country, means that people of all religions should be able to live side by 
side without hatred. 
 
Closing Arguments: Defense 
The Defense argued that the defendant, Michael Campbell, was simply acting in self-defense for 
himself and his family after the victim shoved him at the bus stop. The Defense further stated 
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that the victim, [Mr. Victim] instigated the argument when he threatened to involve the police. 
While the Defense acknowledged that the defendant, Michael Campbell, made hateful comments 
on several occasions, they argued that punishing his thoughts would be in direct violation of his 
First Amendment right of free speech. Finally, the Defense argued that the trial was not about 
criminal behavior, but simply a disagreement of opinions that ended with unfortunate injuries. 
 
Closing Arguments: Prosecution 
The Prosecution argued that a simple disagreement of opinions did not constitute physical 
violence. They further argue that Michael Campbell’s behavior is in direct violation of [Mr. 
Victim’s] First Amendment right to freedom of religion. Further, the Prosecution argues that the 
victim’s injuries were so severe, that a failure to convict the defendant of assault primarily 
motivated by bias would be unjust. 
 
Judge’s Instructions 
Aggravated Assault: Bodily Injury with a Deadly Weapon 
NJSA 2C:12-1b(2) 
To find the defendant guilty of causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following elements: 
4. That the defendant caused bodily injury to another; and 
5. That the defendant caused the bodily injury by use of a deadly weapon; and 
6. That the defendant acted purposely or knowingly. 
By definition, a deadly weapon is any firearm or weapon, device, instrument, material or 
substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used 




A person is guilty of the crime of bias intimidation if he commits, attempts to commit, conspires 
with another to commit, or threatens the immediate commission of an offense 
4. With a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, 
color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, or ethnicity; or 
5. Knowing that the conduct constituting the offense would cause an individual or group 
of individuals to be intimidated because of race, color, religion, gender, handicap, 
sexual orientation, or ethnicity; or 
6. Under circumstances that caused any victim of the underlying offense to be 
intimidated and the victim, considering the manner in which the offense was 
committed, reasonably believed either that (a) the offense was committed with a 
purpose to intimidate the victim or any person or entity in whose welfare the victim is 
interested because of race, color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, or 
ethnicity, or (b) the victim or the victim’s property was selected to be the target of the 
offense because of the victim’s race, color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual 






Participants will respond to the following questions prior to reading the trial summary. 
1. In general, how much do you like Jewish people? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Very much  
2. How violent do you think Jewish people are? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Extremely 
Violent         Violent  
3. In general, how much do you like Muslim people? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Very much  
4. How violent do you think Muslim people are? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Extremely 
Violent         Violent  
5. In general, how much do you like Christian people? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Very much 
6. How violent do you think Christian people are? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Extremely 
Violent         Violent 
7. In general, how much do you like Atheists? 
 
 55 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Very much 
8. How violent do you think Atheists are? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Extremely 
Violent         Violent 




d. Atheist/Not Religious 
e. Other Religion 
f. I prefer not to answer 
10. How religious are you? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Extremely 
religious         religious 
11. Please report the percentage of hate crimes perpetrated because of religious identity that 
occur against each of the four religious groups (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Atheist). 
Note: you are dividing 100% among just the four religious groups listed. 
a. Christian =  
b. Muslim =  
c. Jewish =  
d. Atheist =  
e. Total = 100% 
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Participants will respond to the following questions after reading the trial summary. 
1. Please rate how guilty you believe the defendant is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Completely 
guilty          guilty 
2. Please render your verdict 
a. Not Guilty 
b. Guilty of Aggravated Assault 
c. Guilty of Hate Crime and Aggravated Assault 
3. Please rate how confident you are in your verdict. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Completely 
confident         confident 








6. Please rate how much you feel the victim is to blame for the event in question. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Very much 
 
7. Please rate how much sympathy you feel towards the victim. 




No sympathy         Extreme 
at all          sympathy 
8. Please rate how much you think the victim’s actions were motivated by bias (prejudice 
against someone that is considered to be unfair). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Completely 
motivated by bias       motivated by bias 
9. Please rate how capable you believe the victim was to cause serious physical harm to the 
defendant. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Completely 
capable         capable 
10. Please rate how greedy you think the victim is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
greedy          greedy 
11. Please rate how violent you think the victim is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
violent          violent 
12. Please rate how moral you think the victim is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
moral          moral 
13. Please rate how trustworthy the victim is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
trustworthy         trustworthy 
14. Please rate how much you feel the defendant is to blame for the events in question. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Completely 
to blame         to blame 
15. Please rate how much sympathy you feel towards the defendant. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
No sympathy         Extreme 
at all          sympathy 
16. Please rate how much you think the defendant’s actions were motivated by bias 
(prejudice against someone that is considered to be unfair). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Not at all         Completely 
motivated by bias       motivated by bias 
17. Please rate how capable you believe the defendant was to cause serious physical harm to 
the victim. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Completely 
capable         capable 
18. Please rate how greedy you think the defendant is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
greedy          greedy 
19. Please rate how violent you think the defendant is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
violent          violent 
20. Please rate how moral you think the defendant is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
moral          moral 
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21. Please rate how trustworthy the defendant is. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Extremely 
trustworthy         trustworthy 




d. Prefer not to answer 
 
23. What is your race? 
 
a. American Indian/Alaskan Native 
b. Asian or Pacific Islander 
















26. How old are you? (open-ended) 
 
27. Please describe your political orientation. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely         Extremely 






This experiment examined how we use information in the courtroom when we serve as jurors. 
Previous research has shown that juror perceptions of a victim and defendant affects verdict 
decisions in the courtroom. Specifically, jurors who have a bias against the victim in the case are 
less likely to render a guilty verdict. 
In the present experiment, individuals received evidence about a fictitious defendant during a 
court trial, and then had to use the evidence to determine the guilt or innocence of the person in a 
criminal trial. The case was about a victim of a hate crime targeted because of his religion. It was 
predicted that the juror perceptions of the defendant and victim would impact their verdict 
decisions. Specifically, participants with negative perceptions of the victim’s religion would be 
less likely to convict the defendant of being guilty of a hate crime. 
Thank you for your help with this study. It would not be possible to continue psychological 
research without your cooperation and goodwill. We hope you enjoyed this experiment. If you 
would like to learn more about this experiment, you may contact me. We expect to have the 
results analyzed in approximately four months, so if you are curious about what happened feel 
free to contact me via email. 
Jonathan Golding 
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